From Iran to Gaza, Pakistan is betting that relationships across rival blocs can give middle powers greater diplomatic influence as the Security Council struggles to act.
Pakistan entered its Security Council term carrying the baggage of its own regional rivalries. It may leave it arguing that those same geopolitical relationships have become an asset. As great-power divisions increasingly constrain the Council, Islamabad says its ability to speak simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and key Arab capitals has given it unusual room to mediate.
“Pakistan brings something different to the Security Council, and that is because we have the ability to have channels of communication with all of the P5 at the same time,” Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, told Envoy in an exclusive interview at his office. “With our fellow elected members, this gives us a great edge.”
Pakistan has sought to put that diplomatic reach to use, most recently in efforts to secure a ceasefire between the United States and Iran. “I think our engagement was not just about bringing about the ceasefire,” Ahmad said. “It actually broke the momentum of war, and it created space for diplomacy and dialogue.”
Ahmad argues that Pakistan enjoys unusually broad access across the Council, allowing it to move between blocs that increasingly struggle to talk to one another. “You will see that among the Western Europeans, they have issues sometimes with Russia, sometimes with China,” he said. “There are others who have issues with the Americans or the British or the French. We have this ability to work across blocs and regional groups. So we bring, I mean, our constituency is big.”
Yet Ahmad does not see the rise of middle-power diplomacy as evidence that the UN is obsolete. Even when negotiations take place elsewhere, he argues, the Security Council still provides something individual states cannot: legitimacy, oversight and a framework for implementation.
“Even in the case of the US-Iran negotiations, I think the ultimate thinking was that if the follow up go through with the negotiations as envisaged in the Islamabad MOU, and they reach a final deal, that would need to be brought to the Security Council to see that there are mechanisms in place and to ensure that it will be implemented,” he told Envoy.
But Pakistan is hardly leaving the Council satisfied with how it works. Ahmad is particularly critical of the P5, arguing that they often fail to cooperate on substantive crises while readily closing ranks to protect their institutional power.
“They do work together, where they see that their interests converge,” he said, referring to the P5. “These could be apparently very small little things for the outside world, but they work together on their influence and how they want to preserve their influence.”
Ahmad spoke to Envoy on August 4. His remarks have been condensed and edited for clarity.
Envoy: You have only a few months left on the Security Council. Looking back, what has Pakistan accomplished, and what remains unfinished?
Ahmad
We are three-fourths through the Security Council, and Pakistan has been quite frequently on the Security Council. This is our eighth tenure, so we’ve been there every 10 years. So that means that we bring a lot of experience, institutional knowledge, and expertise to the work of the Security Council. […]
It’s important to note that resolution [2788] was adopted at a time when the council was really deeply divided on Gaza, Ukraine, on so many other issues. Many of our fellow council members and others thought it would not be possible to have such a resolution adopted by the Security Council, but we were able to get it adopted by consensus, which is a big success in my view, and that also shows that Pakistan brings something different to the Security Council, and that is because we have the ability to have channels of communication with all of the P5 at the same time.
With our fellow elected members, this gives us a great edge. You can look at the 15 members of the Council, and you can see which country can comfortably speak to all 14. You will see that among the Western Europeans, they have issues sometimes with Russia, sometimes with China. There are others who have issues with the Americans or the British or the French. We have this ability to work across blocs and regional groups. Our constituency is big. We represent the non-aligned countries. We represent the OIC, the G77, but we work beyond that. We have very close relations with the Western countries, the US, the P3, at the same time with China and Russia, and obviously with our fellow council members. Whenever we bring an initiative, we consult deeply, and we are a touchboard. We are able to get other colleagues around our initiative, and then a very practical manifestation of what we did last year, promoting this peaceful settlement of disputes is our role on some of the biggest issues or crises that are currently on the agenda of the Security Council. […]
This year in the US-Iran situation, we played a role, and that again, it drew inspiration from our deep commitment to dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes. So we knew that this was a situation that was spiraling out of control, and then since we are in the Security Council also, I think it made all the sense that we tried to play a role, which we did, and I would say, notwithstanding what has happened, and there have been ups and downs, but we were instrumental in having the ceasefire announced at the beginning of April.
Then, we brought the two parties together face to face at the highest level for many decades in Islamabad, and then this process continued, and we had the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding agreed on June 17, which provides a framework in which the two sides agreed that they will have further consultations, further negotiations to go through all the points that are mentioned in the MOU with the view to reaching a final deal.
In New York, everyone was very worried from February onwards as to what was going to happen, so I think our engagement was not just about bringing about the ceasefire. It actually broke the momentum of war, and it created space for diplomacy and dialogue. Although you see skirmishes and ups and downs, I personally believe that that momentum was broken. It’s not feasible to go back to open confrontation again and then now we are seeing signals again that there could be a resumption of contacts.
Our leadership is very committed. We remain in touch with all sides. Pakistan has the ability to work across blocs. We have our own expanded circle of friends with which we work very closely. On this, we also work closely with Saudi Arabia, with Turkiye and Qatar, and also with China. We have close contacts with Russia also, and then one big factor which enabled us to play this role was that Pakistan was perhaps the only, or maybe one of very few countries that had the trust of both sides, and that also emanates from a very objective position that Pakistan adopted from the very beginning on this point. There are so many other issues. We are deeply engaged in that in Africa and elsewhere. But I sense that mostly it is these issues that gain wider attention: Middle East, West Asia, Ukraine.
Envoy: How did Pakistan’s mediator role translate into your work at the UN and the Security Council?
Ahmad
I think it was a division of labor. Much of this process was taking place outside the UN, and mostly at the leadership levels. From our side, the prime minister [Shehbaz Sharif], the deputy prime minister and foreign minister [Ishaq Dar], [and] the chief of defense [Field Marshal Asim Munir], were directly and personally involved.
Similarly, from the US we have the president [Donald Trump], vice president [JD Vance], Mr. [Jared] Kushner, [US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff], and [Secretary of State Marco Rubio]. Iranian top people were also involved. In parallel, many things were happening in the UN, you remember that there were resolutions that were tabled on which people had different perspectives. One resolution was adopted in the beginning, 2817, but then there was another one that was vetoed. There was another one which was tabled but never voted. So we had to engage on this side also, to see what was doable, what role we could play. Our main message was that all efforts should converge in the sense that you create space for diplomacy, and to try to see that you can bring the two parties to some kind of agreement.
I think we were able to do that first in the form of a ceasefire, and then continued negotiations that led to the signing of the Islamabad MOU. In parallel, there were discussions that have been taking place in the UN.
You remember, the secretary-general had his own initiative, which actually couldn’t go that far. This was along the lines of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, but even they knew that the best way to comprehensively and conclusively address the situation was through an agreement between the parties rather than some ad hoc mechanisms, which might help temporarily but would not bring a durable solution.
Envoy: More peace negotiations are now taking place outside the UN. Why has the organization been sidelined?
Ahmad
I think it was never a clear progression. It was up and down, as regards the UN’s role in major issues and crisis situations. So even in the past, you can recall many instances where the UN was playing second fiddle, and there were like coalitions of the willing or other, some countries coming together, but now it is slightly more evident because it’s very well known that the UN itself and the whole multilateral system is under stress. That’s very clear.
The other trend is that there is a very obvious multipolar situation. As you mentioned, in the whole scenario, it’s not just the big powers who are going to determine or decide how things will evolve and be decided. Particularly when some of the same countries are themselves engaged or involved in those conflicts, so it has obviously created more space for other countries, including middle powers. Pakistan is one of them. You have Saudi Arabia, you have Turkiye, others which are committed, which have the resources, which also have the trust in these lines of communication, the ability to talk and to engage across the blocs, not just West, East, North, South, and the ability to build and forge consensus.
That’s how some of these countries, including Pakistan, are playing this role. And as I said, it was not just the US and Iran. We were very instrumental in this Gaza [initiative] last year, when the leaders of eight countries, including Pakistan, Turkiye, Indonesia and five Arab countries met with President Trump last September that led to the Peace Plan, and then 2803.
That made an impact, but I agree with you that there is a sense that on some of the major issues, the UN seems to be marginalized. I think that’s not the fault of the UN itself, but this is a logical outcome of scenarios in which you see one or the other of the big powers or the permanent members, they are directly involved, and when there is little appetite on their side to let the UN or the Security Council or the secretary-general to play a leading role. Then obviously the SG and the Council would risk being marginalized.
But having said that, the importance of multilateralism and the credibility, the convening power, the legitimacy that rests with the UN is very much there, and it’s very difficult to do without it. One big example again: the Gaza plan. It had to be, in a way, endorsed and legitimized, given that credibility through the Security Council, so that’s why you had resolution 2803. It was done outside the UN, but it had to be brought back to the Council to have that endorsement, to have that oversight and follow up.
This has been the case for many of the major issues. Even in the case of the US-Iran negotiations, I think the ultimate thinking was that if the follow up go through with the negotiations as envisaged in the Islamabad MOU, and they reach a final deal, that would need to be brought to the Security Council to see that there are mechanisms in place and to ensure that it will be implemented, like it was with the JCPOA.
Much of the discussions were held outside, but it was brought to the UN. And especially when it concerns peace and security, it’s the Security Council that gives credence to those efforts, but it varies at what stage they would bring the matter back to the Security Council. But it doesn’t mean that it’s not discussed anymore in the Security Council. I think the overall attachment to the idea of the UN remaining very relevant is very much there for the majority of the UN membership.
All we need to do is to see how we navigate these difficult times because there are financial pressures, there are political tensions, and if you see the peace and security landscape, the development landscape, climate, human rights, these are huge challenges, which actually need more of the UN rather than less.
But, in reality, you see that there is disruption, and instead of integration, there is fragmentation, which is not helping the situation. So eventually, I think as things improve a little bit, you should expect that things will start reconverging around the UN. We have to move back from this fragmentation to more situations of cooperation and the UN is the best available avenue at the moment. Many people criticize the UN, you have all kinds of complaints, but there is no alternative to the UN, particularly its convening power and the legitimacy that it accords to the processes and agreements.
We have great faith, and I talk to many PRs, and I think the vast majority is still very much attached to that. That’s why you see year after year, in September, all the world leaders flock to New York. I think there is a reason behind that. If they think that the UN is no more relevant, you won’t see that happening; why would world leaders converge every year, despite all the challenges and everything, to come to New York and to share their perspective and to see how we can work together?
Envoy: What can the P5 still agree on?
There are lots of opportunities. There are many situations in which they can work together, and they do work together. Even today, when they see that their interests converge, they come together, and these could be apparently very small little things for the outside world, but they know what is their influence and how they want to preserve their influence, especially in the Security Council. One way of doing that is to keep a stronghold on the council’s working methods. That’s why on any serious proposals about more transparency and things to improve more democratic decision-making in the council, you would see that it automatically brings the P5 together against that.
The elected members are usually on one side, and the P5 are on the other side sometimes, and they don’t even care as to what happens to the work of the council. For example, the chairs and vice chairs of the subsidiary bodies, the sanctions committees–they are not yet appointed. Now we are into August. This is the eighth month without the chairs and vice chairs, and it’s all revolving around some of the issues. I’m not saying they’re not important issues, but they are deadlocked. The result is that this has not been done and the Council’s work has suffered similarly last year, and we wasted six months. It was only at the end of June, that the chairs and vice chairs were appointed. So, for five of us that joined the council last year, so far in like 18 months, we have had only six months in which we were chairing one committee or the other.
Similarly, on one of the most important issues that is underway now is the selection of the SG. Here you also see the procedure, on the influence and hold of the permanent members, they don’t want to cede any territory, no space on that.
But it doesn’t mean that others don’t have a role to play. So you have 15; at least 10 of them are elected members. Everyone has a vote. Everyone voted. Every vote counts, and the color-coded [ballots] that come at a later stage.
In the initial stage, everyone has a similar vote, the same weightage. We do have a role, and I think that is increasingly being appreciated.
Even on other issues in the Security Council, the elected members have been playing a very important role. Like last year, also before that, on Gaza, Palestine, and other issues on many things, it’s the elected members who have brought initiatives that have clicked.
In this new landscape where you say there are middle powers who are playing their role, then there are new developments like this role of technology in warfare, AI–there’s all these legal and ethical issues about use of AI in warfare and use of force, where you have to draw a line where AI is either assisting humans in making their decisions, or displacing the humans from that very crucial decision-making in use of force. These and many other things like development, climate, and all of that. I think it is still very obvious that events will continue to be relevant.
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