The collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has marked a turning point in Syria’s protracted conflict. While it has opened the door to potential political and social reforms, it has also intensified power struggles among local factions, regional powers, and international actors. The emergence of the interim government led by HTS, the continued impact of sanctions, and the policies of neighbors and global powers alike have created a complex and volatile landscape.
In the aftermath of Assad’s fall, HTS has become a dominant force in Syria. However, its governance model is marked by controversy. Critics point to reports of human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions and suppression of dissent, often fueled by religious zealotry. Many however in Syria view the group as a necessary evil, providing a semblance of stability in an otherwise chaotic environment.
A continuing humanitarian crisis: Sanctions or Reconstruction?
Amid political instability and economic underdevelopment, there arises the question of post-war reconstruction. Former US Ambassador in Syria and Senior Fellow at the Washington Middle East Institute, Robert Ford outlines the complexity of Western involvement: even though they are divided,” The Europeans, some of the countries, I think, want to take bigger steps towards providing sanctions relief, which is really necessary for the Syrian state and the Syrian public to access financing to reconstruct.” Yet rivalries among fractions, local power centers and “alternative governance structures” -as Jake Sotiriadis, former US Air Force intelligence officer and intelligence expert puts it- “create fundamental challenges for traditional post-conflict reconstruction models.”
With the collapse of centralized governance, the country faces economic fragmentation, hyperinflation, and a humanitarian crisis that affects millions. Over 14 million people have been displaced, and access to basic services such as clean water, healthcare, and education remains severely limited. Refugee camps and informal settlements are overcrowded and under-resourced, creating dire conditions for millions of Syrians.
Meanwhile, UN, US, EU and European states sanctions may target individuals and entities linked to human rights abuses, corruption and terrorism, but further cripple Syria’s already devastated economy, often harm disproportionately civilians and significantly hamper international aid. As a result, humanitarian organizations have called for targeted exemptions to ensure the delivery of medical supplies and food. Proponents of the sanctions, however, maintain that they are necessary to prevent warlords and extremist groups from consolidating power. Balancing accountability and humanitarian considerations remain a critical challenge; one soon to reach the UN Security Council.
While this article was being written, both the West and the international community faced with a riddle: how to help in the reconstruction of Syria without aiding entities and individuals under sanctions. So far, the answer seems to be following a “try and test” approach; namely, easing (or even lifting) sanctions in gradual and reversible steps. Whether this will be effective remains to be seen.
However, as geopolitical strategist John Sitilides says, “The US, the EU and the UN don’t have many options because there is no viable alternative right now to HTS governing Damascus, unless all of these entities seek to put together an external invasion force, which no one wants to do. So HTS does have the reins of power right now. They are filling a vacuum that no one wants to see prolonged in Damascus”, Sitilides notes, while adding that if they move in a different direction “and revert to some type of a terrorist state, you could see a very different international coalition response”.
The role of Turkey
In such an environment, Turkey’s presence only makes the situation more complicated. As a strong neighbor with clear goals and the will and power to pursue them, Turkey -according to Sitilides- “Probably has the lead on the reconstruction of Syria, as it is a proven construction powerhouse.” He notes that Turkish companies played a crucial role in rebuilding northern Iraq and could do the same in Syria. However, he also warns that other regional players, including the Gulf states, may seek to counterbalance Turkish influence.
Yet, while analysts agree that Turkey remains a dominant foreign power in Syria, the true extent of its influence is contested. As Robert Ford, former US Ambassador in Syria and Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington highlights, “Turkey is probably the most important foreign country operating in Syria now”, noting however that he doubts the extent to which Turkey controls the government in Damascus. “There’s a difference between big influence and control.” First of all, “all of NE Syria largely rejects Turkish influence right off the start. Second, the Damascus government is also building relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and all of those serve to balance Turkish influence. And they do it intentionally.” Adding to that, he refers to Turkish officials who told him that “they were not in favor of the November 27th military operation to go forward. They had counseled waiting, and the HDS group went ahead despite the Turkish recommendations. So that’s a clear evidence that although Turkey is influential, they don’t control what HΤS does” he says.
In not so different an analysis, Jake Sotiriadis views Turkey’s policy towards Syria as purely Neo-Ottoman. “A strategy that blends military force, economic leverage, and cultural programs to integrate northern Syria into Ankara’s sphere of influence. The implementation of Turkish administrative systems, including language programs and educational curricula in controlled territories, signals a deeper involvement than mere security operations,” he explains, adding that “the establishment of Turkish-administered zones represents a significant departure from traditional models of international engagement, effectively creating new forms of territorial control while maintaining technical state boundaries”.
The Kurdish question as part of the Syria equation
However, Ankara’s security concerns are reflected in Syria due to the ever-present Kurdish question. As Sitilides argues, “Turkey has long had an outsized interest in dealing with Kurdish separatists, whether it’s the PKK inside of Turkey or the Syrian Kurds in eastern Syria that Turkey considers to be an offshoot of the PKK.” He argues that Turkey will continue to leverage its influence in Damascus to counter Kurdish aspirations, while also navigating the broader geopolitical shifts in Syria.
Yet, the Kurds resist Turkey’s advance not only through military force, but also through assisting the US “in keeping Da’esh terrorists by the thousands detained in order to ensure they don’t wreak havoc in Syria, Iraq and across the Middle East”, as Sitilides notes. To that end, and by the time this article was being written, US forces remained in NE Syria, collaborating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to prevent a potential Da’esh resurgence. Additionally, Washington continues to enforce the Caesar Act, a sanctions framework aimed at curbing the influence of armed groups and fostering accountability for human rights violations.
But the US is not as certain as its military presence may indicate. US policymakers are divided on whether to continue their collaboration with the SDF against terrorism, or prioritize engagement with HTS, itself not so far away from extremism. As a result a potential rollback of US military presence in Syria is a subject of intense debate, with significant consequences both for Kurdish forces operating in the region, as well as the global counter-terrorism efforts.
However, a withdrawal is not imminent, according to Robert Ford: “The Trump administration has not said that it would do that. And the Biden administration did just the opposite. So, I think it will be a long time, before the Trump administration has its State Department and Defense Department teams in place to make decisions about whether or not to withdraw. And in the meantime, they are there. They continue to provide a sort of air cover over the region east of the Euphrates River, which is where most of the autonomous administration is located. If they do withdraw, it will mean that the autonomous administration is in a much more difficult military situation. But, as I say, I would not assume that the Americans are going to withdraw quickly” he notes.
A potential US withdrawal would mean, as Sotiriadis puts it, that “Kurdish authorities would face stark choices about their future governance arrangements. They would likely need to negotiate new security frameworks with either Damascus or Moscow, but from a markedly disadvantaged position. This situation demonstrates the vulnerabilities of non-state actors in an increasingly multipolar regional environment where traditional protection guarantees become less reliable” he says.
One however should not forget that countering Iranian influence remains a top US priority. From his point of view, Sitilides speculates that the Trump administration may push for alternative security arrangements involving Jordan, Egypt, or the Gulf states. “The main goal for the US is the containment of Iranian aggression in the Middle East. And I think President Trump would like to see how moving forward in Syria helps the US and our Sunni allies and Israel focus on the Iranian threat to the region” he notes.
Russia’s Strategic Interests
In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, a geopolitical defeat for Moscow according to many, Russia has sought to maintain its influence by engaging with various factions and promoting itself as a mediator. A pragmatist by nature, and focused on maintaining a strategic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Putin seems to prefer stability over democratization and appears willing to engage with groups like HTS.
So far, Russia’s involvement in Syria has largely centered around securing its military foothold while balancing strategic constraints. As Robert Ford notes, “Deputy FM Bogdanov was there, and I think they have one big agenda item in the short term, which is the continuation of their military bases, the air base at Hameimim and the naval facility at Tartus. However, after the way the Russian military behaved during the Syrian civil war, and the war crimes committed by the Russian air force, I think it will be difficult for the interim government to make any promises of military cooperation with Russia”.
Sotiriadis highlights that ”Russia’s position in Syria reflects a broader strategic recalibration of its regional interests. Moscow’s influence has evolved toward a more focused approach centered on protecting core strategic assets like the Tartus naval facility while reducing its broader regional commitments. This shift stems partly from resource constraints related to other military engagements, leading Russia to adopt a more diplomatic role in managing regional relationships rather than expanding its direct military presence. Moving forward, Russia will likely prioritize maintaining its strategic footholds while acting as a mediating force between various regional actors”.
Notwithstanding his pragmatism, we cannot know -according to Sitilides- “to what extent Putin would be successful in trying to renegotiate the leases, given that the new Damascus government that ousted Assad will find it very, very difficult to give a lease for military stationing to a country that propped up the Assad regime and helped it slaughter hundreds of thousands of Syrians. So, it’s highly unlikely that the new government in Damascus will welcome a Russian presence. The question for Russia then becomes, where else do they establish a warm water presence in the Mediterranean Sea to complement their Black Sea fleet? And the initial indications are that they may be looking to negotiate a presence on Libya’s eastern coast. There could also be a fallback position in as far west as Algeria or as far south in the African continent along the Red Sea coast of Sudan. But my own sense is that Russia will continue to probe for openings and opportunities with warm water ports to be able to project power in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East, but it will not be Syria anytime again in the near future” Sitilides says.
The Future of Islamist influence in Syria
Syria’s future, however, is not only about traditional geopolitics. It is also about the extent of Islamist influence under the new HTS-led government, or as a matter of fact, under any potential government.
Robert Ford provides historical and ideological context, explaining why Jihadist-Salafism traditionally reject democratic elections: “The key thing to know is the source of legitimacy of a government. Jihadist-Salafism say that legitimacy comes only from God. And people cannot substitute for God. Doing that is itself blasphemy.” He notes, however, that HTS leader Al Sharaa’s recent statements in favor of elections represent a fundamental ideological break from al-Qaeda’s doctrines. This, therefore, as well as any other “western” decision may make him less popular among a large part of his original base.
Undoubtedly, leading the country will be a delicate act of balance for Al-Sharaa. As Ford argues, “lots of Syrians are worried about where Al Sharaa will take the country. And even if they’re not as worried about Al Sharaa, they’re worried about some of the people around him, like the Justice Minister who was attending women executions in Idlib, or the education minister who changed one of the textbooks to read that Jews and Christians earned the disfavor of God.” For the time being though, as Ford asserts, “there’s total freedom of speech in Damascus now. Syrians are talking about politics everywhere. No longer are they afraid that somebody’s listening to them. Sometimes, when I was discussing politics, people would walk over and join in. Very different from when I was in the country as the US ambassador 14 years ago. Totally different” he says.
Dr Elizabeth Prodromou, Visiting Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, provides an in-depth assessment of the situation in post-Assad Syria, focusing on the role of religion, sectarianism, and the political trajectory of the transitional government. After an unexpectedly rapid fall of Assad, she asserts, “the transition government is dominated by a constellation of groups and factions with Islamist backgrounds”. After all, “the largest concentration of opposition to the Assad regime were a constellation of Islamist and Islamic groups of various types”, she points out.
Yet the HTS is not unified in its ideology. Prodromou identifies “two competing tendencies” within it.
“Firstly a hardline Islamist faction, drawing from the ideological wellspring of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which supports a Syria organized on expliclitly sectarian lines, which would mean a fragmented Syria and secondly a Syrian nationalist faction that advocates for a non-sectarian, unified state”. Thus, “it’s far too soon to tell” which direction Syria will take, she mentions. Although the Trump administration in 2019 declared Da’esh defeated, Professor Prodromou warns that this is a “fiction” and she points to recent Da’esh-related attacks, including in Iran, Moscow and, in terms of ideological influence, even, in New
Orleans. “We’ve seen this movie before,” she says, warning against trusting leaders like Al-Sharaa. at face value. “Consider Kosovo President Hashim Thaci. He said all the right things about building a democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, but he’s now at the Hague, indicted for war crimes that turned on sectarian violence,” Prodromou noted.
But the problem is much deeper than that. In the al-Hol and al-Raj prison camps, thousands of Da’esh fighters and their families are held. If these prisoners are transferred to HTS-controlled prisons, she estimates, there is a risk that they may be released, fueling a resurgence of Da’esh- style violence.
Naturally, Syria’s various religious and ethnic minorities -including Christians, Druzes, Kurds, and Alawites- are deeply concerned about their security. As Prodromou explains, many Islamist groups view Christians as either supporters of the Assad regime or “Western colonial extensions”, forgetting that “the Christians of Syria are indigenous, they have been there for 2,000 years”. In either way, they are potential targets for reprisals. Despite some positive rhetoric from HTS, “the Christian communities are being very prudent and careful,” avoiding sectarian language and emphasizing their role as an “organic part of Syrian society, even as they report incidents of harassment and targeted violence in Aleppo, Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and Damascus.”However careful they might be though, and given the country’s history under the Assad dictatorial regime, inclusivity in governance and legal equality for all Syrians will be a “heavy lift”, she points out.
In a nutshell, Turkey seems influential, but not in full control. Russia is recalibrating its approach, potentially scaling back its military involvement. The United States faces difficult dilemmas regarding both its Kurdish allies, as well as its efforts to counter terrorism and the Iranian influence in the region. And while reconstruction efforts are hampered by geopolitical fragmentation, the political trajectory of HTS remains a major wildcard, with deep implications for the country’s long-term stability.
With multiple actors wildly competing for influence, Syria’s foreign policy direction, political system, governing structures, economic prospects and social fabric remain unclear. And equally uncertain seems its future. A fractured nation is not easy to rebuild, let alone one in the heart of the Middle East.
About The Author
