In the wake of Assad regime’s collapse, sanctions, religious zealotry, local enmities and geopolitical competition shape Syria’s complex and volatile landscape, in which HTS has become a dominant force, fueling not only hopes, but also concerns.
According to UNDP, fourteen years of conflict in Syria have undone nearly four decades of economic, social and human capital progress. $800 billion has been lost from Syria’s GDP, nine out of ten people live in poverty, one in four are unemployed, and three in four depend on humanitarian aid. Amid such a crisis, there arises the question of much needed humanitarian aid and reconstruction. As mentioned in the said report, “at the current 1.3% annual growth rate (2018–2024), Syria’s economy would take 55 years to restore pre-conflict GDP levels. Achieving recovery in 15 years requires 5% annual growth, while catching up to a no-conflict scenario demands 13.9% annual growth”. Yet, reconstruction is itself a game of influence. Former US Ambassador in Syria and Senior Fellow at the Washington Middle East Institute, Robert Ford highlights that, even though they are divided, the Europeans want to take bigger steps towards providing sanctions relief, which is really necessary to access financing to reconstruct. Yet, rivalries among factions, local power centers and “alternative governance structures” -as Jake Sotiriadis, former US Air Force intelligence officer and intelligence expert puts it- “Create fundamental challenges for traditional post-conflict reconstruction models.”
So far, the West has been gradually and reversibly easing sanctions. Whether this will be effective remains to be seen. However, as geopolitical strategist John Sitilides says, they “don’t have many options because there is no viable alternative right now to HTS”. But if Syria “reverts to some type of a terrorist state, you could see a very different international coalition response”.
Turkey and the Kurds
As a strong neighbor with clear goals and the will to pursue them, Turkey -according to Sitilides- probably has the lead on the reconstruction of Syria; much as it has done in northern Iraq. But, as Ford highlights, “there’s a difference between big influence and control. All of northern Syria largely rejects Turkish influence right off the start. The government is building relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and all of those serve to balance Turkish influence. And they do it intentionally”.
In its effort to extend its regional influence, Ankara employs what Sotiriadis calls a Neo-Ottoman strategy, blending “military force, economic leverage, and cultural programs to integrate northern Syria into Ankara’s sphere of influence. The implementation of Turkish administrative systems, including language programs and educational curricula in controlled territories, signals a deeper involvement than mere security operations,” he explains.
Turkey’s movements however may also be seen as a byproduct of what Sitilides calls an “outsized interest in dealing with Kurdish separatists.” Yet, the Kurds resist Turkey’s advance not only through military force, but also through assisting the US “in keeping Daesh terrorists by the thousands detained in order to ensure they don’t wreak havoc in Syria, Iraq and across the Middle East”, as he notes.
For its part, the US seem not as willing to engage in Syria as its military presence there or the continued enforcement of The Ceasar Act may indicate. US policymakers are divided on whether to continue their collaboration with the SDF against terrorism, or prioritize engagement with HTS. As unlikely as it now seems, a potential US withdrawal would mean, as Sotiriadis puts it, a potential renegotiation from the part of the Kurds of “new security frameworks with either Damascus or Moscow, but from a markedly disadvantaged position”.
Russia’s effort to keep its warm water presence
In the aftermath of its protégé’s collapse, Russia seems, according to Sotiriadis, to “adopt a more diplomatic role and act as a mediating force between various regional actors”, largely “due to resource constraints. Its willingness to engage with groups like HTS aims to the protection of” -as Ford puts it- “its military bases, Hameimim Air Base and Tartus naval facility. However, after the way the Russian military behaved during the Syrian civil war, and the war crimes committed by the Russian air force, I think it will be difficult for the interim government to make any promises of military cooperation with Russia”.
Furthermore, as Sitilides points out, Moscow’s “warm water presence in the Mediterranean” (essential to “complement their Black Sea fleet”) is now at risk. If chased away from Syria, Russia “may be looking to negotiate a presence on Libya’s eastern coast. There could also be a fallback position in as far west as Algeria or as far south in the African continent along the Red Sea coast of Sudan”, he says.
The Future of Islamist Influence in Syria
With Syria’s governance and political trajectory in the balance, Ford explains that its belief in political legitimacy emanating from God alone renders Jihadist-Salafism inherently incompatible with democracy. As a result, HTS leader Al Sharaa’s recent statements in favor of elections may make him less popular among a large part of his original -Islamist- base, but in his organization too. Notwithstanding all that, for the time being, “Syrians are talking about politics everywhere. No longer are they afraid that somebody’s listening to them”.
Dr. Elizabeth Prodromou, Visiting Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center asserts that “the transition government is dominated by a constellation of groups and factions with Islamist backgrounds”. However, Prodromou identifies “two competing tendencies” within HTS: “Firstly, a hard-line Islamist faction, which supports a Syria organized on explicitly sectarian lines. Secondly, a Syrian nationalist faction that advocates for a non-sectarian, unified state”. “It’s far too soon to tell” which direction Syria will take, she mentions, while warning against the “friction” of thinking of Da’esh as defeated, especially if the thousands of Da’esh fighters in the al-Hol and al-Raj prison camps are transferred to HTS-controlled prisons. “We’ve seen this movie before”, she says, warning against trusting leaders like Al-Sharaa at face value.
“Russia’s Strategic Shift: Maintaining Footholds in a Changing Syria”
As reports surface of targeted violence all around Syria, the various religious and ethnic minorities -including Christians, Druzes, Kurds, and Alawites- are deeply concerned. Ignoring their more than 2000 years-long presence, many Islamist groups view Christians as either Assad sympathizers or “Western colonial extensions”. Clearly, inclusivity in governance and legal equality for all Syrians will be a “heavy lift”, she points out.
Amid its continuing Odyssey, Syria needs to navigate between the Scylla of Islamism and the Charybdis of poverty, while trying to understand if Turkey is the Sirens or Ithaca.
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