Washington reopens dialogue with Tehran as it seeks a quick foreign policy win
As the geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East grows increasingly unstable, quiet signals have emerged from Washington and Tehran that suggest a potential thaw -or at least a reassessment- in the long-frozen U.S.-Iran nuclear talks.
Yet any movement towards renewed diplomacy occurs in a vastly different global context than the one that gave birth to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The stakes are high this time, but the strategic calculus in a fragile region like the Middle East is more volatile.
The collapse of the JCPOA after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and Iran’s gradual violations of enrichment caps have left both sides in a zone of mutual mistrust. Iran now possesses enough highly enriched uranium to potentially build several nuclear weapons, should it decide to make that leap. While Tehran maintains it has no intention of doing so, its recent refusal to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the installation of advanced centrifuges have alarmed Western officials. Βy the time this article was written, the talks were still proceeding. “It seems like the U.S. prefers this time to pursue these talks on its own with simple, essentially, mediation by Oman, where most of the talks have taken place thus far. The response or the assessment of both sides was very positive. The Iranians described the talks as significant and useful. And the U.S. was even a bit more encouraging, admitting that there were some difficulties, but the talks were very useful. I think the parties, most importantly, agreed to move forward”, underscores Khalil Jahshan, Executive Director of the Arab Center in Washington, DC.
Washington, in turn, has oscillated between outreach and coercion. Sanctions remain the backbone of U.S. leverage, but they have done little to change Iran’s strategic posture. Quiet prisoner exchanges and backchannelling -often mediated by Oman, Qatar, or European intermediaries- have continued intermittently, signalling that both sides still see diplomacy as a useful instrument, if not a preferred one.
For Jahshan, “the European role has changed since Donald Trump pulled out of the previous nuclear agreement with Iran that was negotiated with five other powers, including European allies, in 2018”. He notes that “the administration seems determined to proceed on its own this time, without European participation”. However, he estimates, it is understandable that the US is basically asking European allies to weigh in and put pressure on Iran. “The French announcement was in response -I’m sure- to requests by the American administration”, he points out.
What complicates this latest chapter in nuclear diplomacy is the erratic atmosphere in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally with whom the US cooperates in defense matters, seems to be reconnecting its diplomatic relations with Iran. Qatar is also maintaining diplomatic channels open with Iran. Araqchi’s recent trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar are part of what he describes as “continuous consultations” with neighbouring states, aiming to address “concerns and mutual interests” regarding the nuclear issue. Meanwhile, Tehran has deepened its ties with Beijing and Moscow, creating a multipolar framework in which U.S. sanctions are partially blunted and geopolitical competition undermines the unity of not only the West but the U.N. Security Council, too.
The October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza have further polarized the region, with Iran-backed groups stepping up attacks against U.S. forces and interests in Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea. It seems that for Tehran, the nuclear program is no longer just a bargaining chip; it is a pillar of deterrence and sovereignty in a hostile environment.
As Jahshan puts it, “both parties declared that they have a better understanding of what the other side wants. But still, there is a big discrepancy between the two. The focus is on the nuclear arms this time, or at this point. It does not involve others, even though the U.S. hints that an agreement on the nuclear issues will lead to progress on the regional role of Iran. But Iran is saying these are red lines that cannot be crossed”.
Any new agreement would probably differ from the original JCPOA. U.S. officials are reportedly considering an interim framework, a “less for less” approach, in which Iran would freeze enrichment levels in exchange for limited sanctions relief. This pragmatic model aims to de-escalate tensions without the political cost of a full treaty revival.
“From my assessment, the U.S. keeps hinting at its goal, which is total disarmament. And that Iran, if these talks were to succeed, would not have a nuclear program, would not have an enrichment program. Stored supplies or materials would have to be sent to a third country away from Iran and would not be accessible to Tehran”, Jahshan says.
He argues that, at the same time, “contradictory remarks have been said”, emphasising that “on the one hand, we hear enrichment up to a point, 3.67%, on the other hand, no enrichment at all.”
“Maybe it’s clearer at the talks. So far, they are progressing. And that means that Iran is satisfied with the general framework or the general direction of the talks, and so is the U.S. The US administration is looking for a short and quick victory at this time in the arena of foreign policy. And this could help it as regards its ambitious plans for the Middle East in general, and particularly for this issue in terms of its bilateral relationship with Israel. So, it seems to be pursuing that without bothering too much with the details. The problem is that, as we noticed in 2016 and 2018, the devil lies in the details”, he highlighted.
The U.S.-Iran nuclear issue is no longer a binary puzzle of compliance versus violation; it is an evolving security dilemma entangled with regional dynamics, great power rivalry, and domestic political uncertainties. While a return to the JCPOA framework is politically unlikely, diplomatic engagement remains not only necessary but urgent — to prevent miscalculation, build guardrails, and keep the door open for future negotiation.
“Sanctions have never worked in any region, particularly in the Middle East, and they are essentially economic steps for political reasons, and that’s why they always fail,’’ according to Jahshan.
“Iran has faced some serious difficulties economically, but they have had some loopholes in the arrangement, and they were able to circumvent the sanctions through these loopholes. Look at the progress achieved since the beginning of these talks. In four rounds, the economy of Iran has improved, actually, significantly. When you talk about the exchange rate of one million rial, Iranian rial to the dollar, now it’s down to close to 700,000 or 600,000. It dropped below 800,000. So there is more progress in talks, rather than in sanctions.’’
For now, the diplomacy continues in grey zones: indirect talks, third-party mediation, and crisis deconfliction. In a world of increasing conflicts, managing the U.S.-Iran nuclear file may no longer be about solving the problem, but about preventing it from exploding.
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