The collapse of the Assad regime liberated Syrians from decades of brutal and repressive rule and has opened the way for a better path forward. But the group that has taken over—HTS led by Ahmad al-Shara—has an extremist past, the state and economy are in shambles, and the country continues to suffer from deep divisions. How has the new leadership performed so far, what are the potential scenarios in the near future, and what can the regional and international community do to help Syria move forward?
The Multiple Identities of HTS
When HTS launched its offensive in late November its realistic ambition was to push back government forces from parts of Western Aleppo. As it turned out, the Assad regime had already hollowed out and was a house of cards waiting to be blown over. The HTS push provided the impetus. HTS captured all of Aleppo and then moved quickly to Hama and Homs.
The Assad regime collapsed so quickly that HTS didn’t even have time to motor to Damascus before other armed groups had shoved away the remains of the regime there. HTS leader Shara—then still using his nom de guerre Mohammad Al-Jolani—arrived only the next day.
The reasons for the Assad regime’s extreme weakness were multiple. The willingness of soldiers and officers in Assad’s army to fight for his regime had been eroded by the collapse of wages and income and years of corruption in which the Assad family and its cronies looted the state and economy and left the armed forces and other sectors of society to fend for themselves. Assad’s ally Hezbollah in Lebanon had just been dealt a staggering blow, and their common patron Iran was on the defensive against a resurgent Israel, backed by the US. In addition, over the past months Assad had been distancing himself from the Iranians, acceding to Arab Gulf promises that if he weakened Iran in Syria, he would secure a full return of Arab support to his regime and Syrian reconstruction; so when he needed them most, Damascus and Tehran were not on the warmest terms. Finally, Moscow was distracted and drained by its war in Ukraine and could only provide limited support.
This backstory is important in order to underline the fact that HTS power is limited. While it sits at the center of fragile power in Damascus today, it is not an overwhelming fighting force, but rather the force that found itself holding the mantle of power in Syria after the Assad regime’s sudden collapse.
Mr. Shara, HTS’s leader and recently declared president of today’s post-Assad Syria, has recognized this reality. He has reached out to other political, communal, and armed groups throughout the country, muted the extremist practices of his followers, and promised an inclusive transition.
At the same time, however, he has rushed to strengthen HTS’s precarious hold on power as fast as possible. Without consultation with other groups, he went ahead with appointments that put his HTS followers in key positions throughout the country. In that sense, he appears to be granting his HTS party the same exclusive state control that was recently enjoyed by the Baath Party. At the same time, he is promising political inclusion both in the next government that is supposed to be formed in March and in a National Dialogue conference that is supposed to take place in the coming months as well. But it is not clear if Shara is genuine in his commitment to an inclusive and pluralist Syria, or is using these processes to buy time and consolidate his group’s hold on power, and then use the National Dialogue conference and the ensuing constitution-writing process to push through an Islamist and authoritarian order.
Three Scenarios
With only a few weeks to go by, since HTS took over, it is hard to be certain about which path awaits Syria. However several scenarios can be described. A first and most hopeful scenario is that Shara is true to his more inclusive statements and that as he gains more power and support as head of the Syrian state he can reduce his ties to HTS and lead an inclusive process of building a pluralist and democratic Syria at peace with itself and the world around it.
A second scenario is that the inclusive talk is just a smokescreen to buy time until he and his group can better consolidate their hold on state and economic power.
A third scenario is that the fragile peace that has accompanied the joy of Assad’s demise fades, the acceptance of Shara’s authority in Damascus is challenged, and the country dissolves back into civil war in which various groups re-engage with each other and, it should be said, with Mr. Shara and the new leadership in Damascus. Politics is the art of the possible, and if Shara is intelligent he will realize that his group is too small and radical to rebuild an authoritarian Syria under his rule and that inclusive politics and good governance, not a radical military regime, is the way forward.
There is little doubt that most states in the Middle East and internationally strongly favor the first scenario. Only Iran might favor the third. It should also go without saying that the majority of Syrians favor the first scenario as well. Only Islamist hardliners—perhaps Al Qaeda and some in the Muslim Brotherhood or some Islamic Salafist movements, or the Taliban in Afghanistan—would favor the second. Turkey and Qatar would favor an Islamist-leaning government, but one that was inclusive and pursued good governance, not a radical militant regime.
The fate of Syria will—and should—largely be decided by Syrians. Already Damascus is abuzz with political debate, outlawed for decades, and with political and civil society groups re-engaging with each other and, it should be said, with Mr. Shara and the new leadership in Damascus. Politics is the art of the possible, and if Shara is intelligent he will realize that his group is too small and radical to rebuild an authoritarian Syria under his rule and that inclusive politics and good governance, not a radical military regime, is the way forward.
The international community has enormous leverage and should use it in a positive direction. Turkey and Qatar have a particularly important role to play as they have longstanding relations with the group, and Turkey was a key broker that enabled their growth and put them in a position to score the victory they did. They have a particular responsibility to engage with the group’s leadership to encourage them away from the radical Islamism of their past toward a far more moderate path and to also educate them on the difference in governance between a militia ruling an enclave like Idlib, and a government seeking to build a modern Syrian state and economy integrated into the region and the world. The Arab states, particularly those of the Gulf, will also have much influence as they have the largest amount of capital that will have to be key in funding the rebuilding of the Syrian economy. In the West, many European leaders have already reached out to the new leadership in Damascus and Europe has a large role to play in sharing advice about building inclusive political and economic institutions and holding out incentives in terms of European aid, trade, and investment. But most of the cards in the West will still be held by the United States, particularly because it is American sanctions, held over from the Assad regime period, that block any large-scale economic engagement with Syria. The US was just as caught by surprise by the sudden collapse of the Assad regime as most everyone else. In fact, in the weeks before the collapse, the Biden administration was effectively re-engaging with the Assad regime, figuring that it was here to stay. The US shared the ambition of several Arab states that Assad could be coaxed to reduce Iranian influence in Syria. They engaged with the Assad regime to encourage an accommodation between Assad and the SDF militia forces they backed in the northeast in order to hedge against the risk of incoming president Trump withdrawing suddenly from Syria and leaving the SDF at the mercy of Turkish president Erdogan. They were also engaging Assad to get his commitment to block Iranian resupply of Hezbollah across the Syrian-Lebanese border after Israel’s effective weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon. And while the US doesn’t appear to have had a hand in the Assad collapse it has certainly been seen as a welcome double win for the US: one in which Iranian power has been dealt another blow, and one in which Moscow has also suffered a significant setback.
It is too early to say what the Trump administration’s policy toward Syria will turn out to be. The US has around 2,000 troops in Syria, most in the northeast and some in the southeast border area of Tanf. In the first days of the HTS advance, Trump tweeted that “Syria is a mess, and the US shouldn’t have anything to do with it.” He sought to withdraw US troops from Syria in his first term and is likely to want to get it done in his second term. However, his incoming national security advisor Michael Waltz argued that the US continues to consider the ISIS threat in Syria a high national security interest, and that support to the SDF that controls the Al Hol camp where thousands of ISIS members and families are held is a priority for the US as well. Once the administration settles into place it is fair to expect that it will begin reviewing the Syria sanctions and will likely engage with the new leadership in Syria using that leverage to encourage that leadership toward the first scenario. Trump has said that he enjoys a good relationship with Turkish president Erdogan, and that relationship will be key in navigating America’s interest in wanting to pull out of Syria while not leaving the Kurds to face adverse repercussions from Turkey, and not wanting to lift the lid they have kept on ISIS in Syria.
The US will also be key in managing the relationship between Syria and Israel. Hours after Assad’s fall, Israel went ahead and destroyed much of the Syrian state’s armed forces and sent its troops to occupy additional Syrian land abutting the occupied Golan Heights. The US will be key in avoiding any escalation between the two sides, establishing security arrangements across the border, and encouraging an Israeli withdrawal from these newly occupied lands. A more ambitious goal would be to press Damascus into peace talks with Israel and to aim to add Syria to Trump’s collection of Abraham Accords.
As of this writing, the future of the Syrian transition remains very hard to predict. In most other Arab states, the brief moment of joy and calm that followed the fall of a dictator—in Libya, Iraq, and Yemen, for example—soon dissipated, and the transition spiraled downward toward years of civil war. That risk continues to loom large in Syria. The efforts of the international community should be coordinated and quick. They should support the process already favored by millions of Syrians to press the current leadership in Damascus to stay on the inclusive path, and to help Syria avoid a regression into collapse and civil war. The success of Syria is not only of critical importance to Syrians, including the millions of Syrian refugees who were forced to flee their country but also to the wider Levant and Middle East.
The opinions expressed in op-eds are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the magazine.
The future of the Syrian transition remains very hard to predict
Turkey and Qatar have a particularly important role to play
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